“Russia and Iran Can Play a Role in Modifying Azerbaijan’s Demands.” Believes Garik Misakyan

The second Nagorno-Karabakh War, which occurred between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the fall of 2020, had profound consequences for the Caucasus region, Iran, and Armenia, and provided an opportunity for foreign actors such as Türkiye and Israel to increase their influence in the region. Meanwhile, Türkiye, as the main supporter of Azerbaijan, played a key role in Azerbaijan’s victory in the war with Armenia; however, Russia adopted a different approach to this war. Despite being capable, this country did not act to prevent the war or end it sooner because Russia has its own interests in the Caucasus and does not want to completely jeopardize its relations with any of the parties involved in the war. In order to review the political and economic relations between Iran and Armenia, as well as the security effects of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War on the region, we have conducted an interview with Dr. Garik Misakyan, a prominent expert in Iran-Armenia relations and the history of the Caucasus, which you can read below.

 AVA Diplomatic’s Exclusive Interview with Mr. Garik Misakyan

History and Iran Studies Lecturer at Yerevan State University

 After the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, what developments have occurred in the relations between Iran and Armenia, and what are the causes and consequences of these developments?

At the time of Armenia’s independence in the early nineties, Iran was one of the first countries to recognize Armenia. We have always had friendly and growing relations.

We have two neighboring countries in the east and west with which we have both political and military problems, but Iran is one of the few countries in the region where we have not had any problems with each other over the years and our relations have been friendly.

As mentioned in the past and emphasized now, we have not taken advantage of all the capacities of cooperation between the two countries. To exploit these capacities, it is demanded to pay attention to the existing conditions which are divided into two periods; before and after the recent Nagorno-Karabakh War.

Before the Nagorno-Karabakh War, Iran looked at the Caucasus as Russia’s backyard and for that reason; it did not have a notable presence in the Caucasus as it did not feel any threat from Russia. Also, the extra-regional countries did not have much activity in the Caucasus until we witnessed the interference of the extra-regional countries in the war between Russia and Georgia.

After the Nagorno-Karabakh war, as we lost the Karabakh region, Iran also lost a safe border because before that war, in addition to the border with Armenia, Iran also had an unknown border with Nagorno-Karabakh or Artsakh which was in fact one of the safest border of Iran as there was no threat from that side.

After the war, by observing the conducted analyses over Iran and also examining the field realities, we can realize the existence of some problems for Iran. These problems include Israel’s influence, which is repeatedly mentioned in the Iranian media, as well as some other topics like “smart villages”.

By sensing this danger after the war, to some extent, Iran updated its relations with Armenia i.e. Iran showed its obvious desire to expand relations with Armenia and the negotiations about the economic ties between the two countries increased.

At the terms of Mr. Zohouri and Mr. Sobhani, Iranian ambassadors to Armenia, there were talks over boosting trade exchanges to 3 billion dollars. There were also talks about renovating North-South infrastructure. As a matter of fact, when Iran felt the danger, the relations somehow expanded.

Then, the emerging geopolitical problems tied the interests of both countries together. One of them is the so-called Zangezur corridor which is considered a big threat for both Armenia and Iran. Fortunately, there were efforts made by the two countries for expanding the relations.

According to my assessment, those capacities are still not fully utilized. It’s been years we have been talking about the North-South road but its construction has just begun recently. We lost a part of the Kapan route which has been replaced; however, that route does not enjoy the required capacity for trade between the two countries. Currently, there are some problems for transportation routes between Armenia and Georgia in the north of Armenia. The flood in Lori has destroyed one of the routes and right now only one remains with Georgia which is the North-South road that passes through Armenia’s Shirak province.

How many roads should be constructed in Armenia for the completion of the road corridor between the two countries and what measures should be taken to complete them?

Several roads need to be built, but the construction of Syunik road, which was won by one of the Iranian companies in its tender, will take at least three to five years to be completed.

In the north of Armenia, a major part of the North-South road is almost completed and connected to Georgia. About Tavush region, it is said that we will lose one of the road sections and a replacement road should be built. By the way, the existing infrastructure problems in Armenia’s roads should be solved in the shortest possible time, and the North-South road which connects the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea has great economic and geopolitical significance for Armenia. It is said that India also would like to participate in this project.

Considering the recent developments in the Caucasus region, how possible is the continuation and realization of the Zangezur project? Is the continuation of the war or further attacks from Azerbaijan a possibility?

Being a little bit cautious to predict, it can be said that it is inferable from the statements of the Turkish and Azerbaijani officials including the president of Azerbaijan as well as the discussions raised in the National Security Council of Türkiye that these countries still intend to implement the mentioned project. However, there are two big obstacles ahead of them; one is Iran which has firmly stated its disagreement to the implementation of this project, and Armenia which has also said that it does not agree with the Zangezur corridor.

A proposed plan for the Crossroads of Peace has been submitted but its exact nature is still unclear. Nevertheless, Armenia still prevents the Zangezur corridor from being implemented. Russia has not declared its position clearly yet. The situation on the ground conveys that Russia does not have much desire to create the Zangzor Corridor either.

It is hard to predict the future of this plan but in terms of security, this corridor must not be operated. If Azerbaijan wants to solve this problem through a military attack, in my opinion, thanks to the presence of Iran, it will not have the courage to do so. It seems unlikely that Azerbaijan wants to get involved in a war on Iran’s border.

If Azerbaijan wants to begin a war, it will be in a more northern area in Armenia like Goris. Even in this situation, such an invasion would be difficult for Azerbaijan as Armenia and its allies will react.

Can it be said that Russia fully left Armenia alone during the recent Nagorno-Karabakh War?

The ones who bring up this are actually referring to a conspiracy theory.  Of course, in the Nagorno-Karabakh War, Azerbaijan made good use of the geopolitical situation in the region as Russia was involved in the Ukraine war, Iran was involved in its own issues, and the United States was holding elections. Additionally, President Rouhani’s administration in Iran, which focused on improving the country’s economy, had built good economic ties with Baku. Therefore, Azerbaijan benefited from several regional dimensions and managed to win the war. Also, we noticed that the Iranian high-ranking officials congratulated Azerbaijan on its dominance over the Karabakh region. This shows that Azerbaijan could take advantage of the existing geopolitical conditions. Before that, there were some disputes in Iran’s relations with Armenia over the issue of the Israeli embassy. Back then, Armenia’s relations with Russia and France also faced challenges. All these elements worked in favor of Baku in that war.

To what extent did the opening of the Armenian embassy in Israel before the Nagorno-Karabakh War affect the relations between Iran and Armenia?

Prior to the Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) War, the opening of the Armenian embassy in Israel was a controversial issue. Some of the governmental sectors of Iran had harsh reactions at that time, although some neighboring countries of Iran had embassies in Israel and they established close relations with Israel. This issue somehow had affected the relations between Iran and Armenia before the outset of the war.

After the war, there was this theory in Iran that if the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia ends and Azerbaijan can capture Artsakh, peace will be established in the region and the risk of war on Iran’s borders will be dramatically reduced, but subsequent incidents revealed that idea was completely wrong as the threat against Armenia and Iran increased significantly after the war. Issues such as the Zengezur corridor, Türkiye’s expansionism and Israel’s stronger presence in the region showed that Iran’s prediction was wrong.

How are the relations between Armenia and Israel now? And what effects do these relations have on Armenia’s interactions with Iran?

In fact, Armenia has almost never had very good relations with Israel. Armenia has always considered its relations with Iran more important than relations with Israel, and this approach continues to this day.

There are also disputes between the two parties over Jerusalem and the Armenian Patriarchate in that city which signifies the absence of close and friendly relations between Armenia and Israel.

In comparison with Israel’s relations with Baku or Georgia, we have a low level of interaction with Israel. We have only established an economic relationship with Israel, which is not the matter of importance to Armenia as the volume of our trade with each other is not significant.

In the past, around five to six years ago, there were some talks about buying drones from Israel which did not materialize. In brief, it can be said that the relations between Armenia and Israel are not close at the moment.

What factors have caused the level of economic relations between Iran and Armenia in the past to not be as high as today, and what factors have helped the increase of the economic relations between these two countries and the Eurasian Economic Union?

As a matter of fact, if we look back to the previous years, we see fewer exchanges between the two countries. Iran also did not actively try to boost its economic ties with Armenia. Iran’s northern roads passed through the territory of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Türkiye and during that period, Iran did not have such problems. As a result, Iran’s desire to expand relations with Armenia was not as much as it is today. Russia had an active presence in that region. Our entry into the Eurasian market increased our economic dependence on Russia. With Armenia’s mediation, the proximity of Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union started, and finally the free trade agreement of Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union was signed.

Besides geopolitical problems, there are obstacles ahead of investment in road construction in a way that there have been delays in repayment of the loans received. In simpler words, both countries have understood the importance of this matter somewhat late. The occurrence of Nagorno-Karabakh War and the loss of a part of Armenia’s land, once again manifested the significance of the common border of Iran and Armenia. By the way, these economic relations have not yet reached their utmost capacity. If the completion of these roads is done quickly and Iran can increase its northern transportation towards Armenia, this will be very beneficial for both countries economically and geopolitically.

With the opening of the Iranian consulate in the Syunik region, the importance of this region will further increase. This signifies the geopolitical importance of this region and practically opens Iran’s hands in its relations with northern countries such as Georgia, Azerbaijan and Türkiye and reduces Iran’s dependence on Türkiye in the field of transportation.

How important is the reopening of the Armenian Consulate General in Tabriz? What effects will this action have on expansion of cultural, economic and political relations between the two countries?

It was very important and the decision to reopen the consulate general was eventually made. This case has been brought up before; after the opening of the Iranian Consulate General in Kapan and due to the situation that arose during the war.

It provides the basis for enhancing cultural, economic and political relations between Armenia and Iran, especially its northern regions including West Azerbaijan and East Azerbaijan provinces. West Azerbaijan and East Azerbaijan, as two important economic zones of Iran, will definitely benefit from this measure.

Has the new consul general of Armenia in Tabriz been appointed?

The case of establishing the consulate general is finalized, but the consul general has not been introduced yet.

Tabriz is a city where the presence of a seasoned diplomat is required there; a person who has enough knowledge of Iran so that he/she can establish a constructive interaction with the Azeri people of Tabriz as well as authorities in Tehran.

From a geopolitical point of view, Tabriz is a crucial region and plays a key role as a transportation crossroads between Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Iraqi Kurdistan.

To what extent can it be said that Mr. Pashinyan’s approach in handing over the disputed villages has helped the process of tension reduction and peace with Azerbaijan?

We are seeing protests inside the country and so far the government has not been able to explain the achievements of this measure in a clear and understanding manner to the nation.

The statements of the President of Baku, which are expressed by Türkiye, signify a serious lack of desire for peace.

After the complete capture of Karabakh, they raised new demands and also occupied a part of Armenian territory. In addition, some other regions close to Jermuk and Lake Sevan are still in their possession.

In fact, the Azerbaijani authorities escalate the tensions. For example, they have set up some organizations in Baku and chosen the fake name of “West Azerbaijan” for Armenia. Despite the fact that Azerbaijan itself has no significant historical background, they have also made a western part for themselves.

They change the name of Armenian geographical places to Turkish words. This shows that this country does not back down from its expansionism policy. In regard to the Zangezur corridor, Azerbaijan has not backtracked and constantly threatens Armenia. On the other hand, with every retreat of the Armenian government, Azerbaijan’s greed increases.

If we happen to review our achievements until now, we should say that no significant achievements have been made so far. It is said that a peace agreement is supposed to be signed; however, its nature is not still clear. The current situation shows that both issues (occupation of Karabakh and Zangezur corridor) are not going in favor of Armenia.

What were the reasons for Russia’s non-intervention in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War?

Geopolitically, it seems that the Russians were considering the Ukraine war and were not eager to be involved in another war. They thought that Armenia could maintain a part of Karabakh, but Azerbaijan captured the whole region by force.

To what extent can it be said that Russia’s miscalculation of Azerbaijan’s military advance was one of the reasons that this country did not directly enter the Nagorno-Karabakh War?

In my opinion, it is like that, but a country that is an empire should have already predicted this. Of course, Russia has been the first and the most important strategic ally of Armenia for years and it should not have retreated in some cases due to the war in Ukraine because a massive country like Russia is able to fight on two or three fronts simultaneously.

There are many troubles and questions in the relationship between Armenia and Russia. Western countries also took advantage of these Russian mistakes and increased their influence both in the public space and in the Armenian government, and made Russia’s role weaker.

Today, most Armenians consider Iran, not Russia nor the West, as one of their main allies. In fact, it was Russia’s fault that caused this situation.

Of course, Russia was not that much unsupportive to Armenia as it is claimed, however, it did not provide the necessary backings. In this way, Armenia and Russia made mistakes.

How do you evaluate the role and influence of foreign states in the escalation of tensions and the occurrence of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War between Azerbaijan and Armenia?

Actually, the tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan has never been separated from the interference of other countries. During the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, Mr. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the then president of Iran, did mediation. Later on, Russia, France and the United States took actions and formed the Minsk Group for negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

During the recent Nagorno-Karabakh War, we witnessed Türkiye’s direct military intervention, in such a way that it supported almost the entire Azerbaijani army with Israeli weapons.

After the war, the role of extra-regional countries, especially Israel, has become stronger in Azerbaijan, and the role of Türkiye has also increased significantly in this country. It can be said that Türkiye has never had this much influence and power in Azerbaijan, and the role of Russia has become weaker after the departure of its peacekeeping forces from the region. Although this country still has a military base in Armenia, its influence and power have decreased dramatically compared to ten years ago.

The role of Western countries, especially the United States and France, has become more notable in Armenia. Of course, we have always had a good relationship with France, and there is a very strong Armenian diaspora community in France.

Iran has also become more active by that policy I pointed out. One of the challenges Iran faces is the preservation of its influence in the region. Needless to say that there is not such a problem regarding Armenia as it is considered a favored neighbor for Iran.

We feel the importance of the border with Iran very well. At the war time, there was only this border open, even Georgia had closed its border with us.

We have witnessed consecutive crises in Iran and Azerbaijan relations, which show that Baku has no desire for peace in the near future. After the Nagorno-Karabakh War, discussions have been raised about West Azerbaijan and this topic has been widely reflected in the media of Azerbaijan, including the state television of this country. Also, there have been discussions in this regard in the Iranian press. These developments show that Azerbaijan currently has bigger plans in the region, which do not seem to be aligned with peace and stability in the region.

Why did not the United States intervene in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and how did the Armenian and Azerbaijani lobbies in the United States and Russia affect this war?

One of the reasons for the non-intervention of the United States was the presidency of Donald Trump. Another factor was the prominent role of American and Israeli Jews, which even Baku benefits from. Back then, the Jewish lobby was in cooperation with its Israeli ally, Baku. The Armenian lobby was not idle either and has been actively working through its influence for Armenia as well as for the relations between Iran and the United States.

However, the geopolitical situation was such that Armenia was an ally of Russia at that time, and after Pashinyan, a gap emerged between the diaspora and the Armenian government. This gap, along with a series of mistakes, weakened the power of the Armenian lobby due to the lack of governmental support. Even inside Russia, despite the strong lobby we had, as a consequence of lack of sufficient support from the Armenian government, the Azerbaijani lobby was able to act more powerfully during the war.

Considering the gap between the diaspora and the Armenian government, what scenarios can be considered for the future of this relation? Is it possible to repair this gap in the upcoming elections or will the current trend go on?

The Armenian internal situation is much more complicated as the current government of Armenia has lost its past popularity and the previous governments are not that much popular either. If we look at the former presidents, we see that none of them have considerable popularity in Armenia.

The Dashnaktsutyun party, which has a long history in Armenia, is not that much popular in Armenia at the moment. The Armenian diaspora is mainly about two parties: Hunchakian and Dashnaktsutyun.

It is really hard to predict the upcoming elections in Armenia. Right now, there are demonstrations, political movements and conflicts in Armenia and if they do not see their demands fulfilled, I suppose we will see the emergence of new political forces in Armenia that will be more active in the next elections.

There are two years left until the next elections in Armenia. Is there any hope that Pashinyan will be able to reach peace with Azerbaijan and stabilize his position by then?

Given the comprehension we have about the two countries of Türkiye and Azerbaijan throughout history, I am not very confident about peace in the region.

As long as Armenia speaks from a weak position, there will be no peace. This policy should be changed. Armenia’s relations with regional and extra-regional countries should be enhanced. Of course, it should be noted that Russia, Iran and other countries can play a role in reducing tensions and modifying Azerbaijan’s demands.

What effect will the re-election of Trump as the president of the United States have on the developments in the region, especially in Armenia and Iran?

There will be more complications, both for Armenia and probably for the whole region including Iran and Russia. At the time being, Trump is facing accusations in the court and a sentence has been issued against him and there is a possibility that he may be imprisoned. It is not yet evident whether he will be re-elected or not. If Trump is re-elected, considering his measures in the previous term of the presidency, especially towards the region and his close relations with Israel, it can be foretold that he will be an unpredictable president and there will be problems that will be probably felt in the Caucasus region.